The topic of how and why a Christian should vote is one that has stirred a great deal of discussion, even controversy. The most numerous group among Christian voters argues that Christians have a duty to preserve the country whatever the cost. These hold that a vote is in no way an endorsement of the person or thing being voted for, merely an acknowledgment that it is better than the alternative. Another, smaller, group maintains that a vote is an overt acceptance of the qualifications of the thing voted for, and thus implies that the voter believes it acceptable. Preserving the country at the cost of accepting the unacceptable would abhorrent to members of this group. The difference, striking as it is on a philosophical level, often, but not always, leaves the two groups in agreement. For the few times when the two groups diverge, however, it is imperative to understand the arguments on both sides and to have reached a conclusion.
Those in the first group often characterize their voting as being for the “lesser of two evils.” Because the alternative would be worse, the reasoning goes, it is, in fact, a positive good to support the lesser evil. Because the way one votes is not even a tacit acceptance of the qualifications of the thing voted for the voter cannot be held accountable for the actions of the candidate he votes for once that candidate is elected. The greater good of preventing the worse evil transcends the immediate repulsiveness of throwing support behind an “evil” cause. This logic is used to justify voting for a candidate who would otherwise be entirely unacceptable—for example, a candidate who supported public funding of abortion, something Christians as a whole would otherwise refuse to support, could be made acceptable if his opponent was worse, as was the case for many Christians in the 2008 presidential contest between John McCain and Barack Obama.
In contrast, those in the second group reject the idea that it could ever be acceptable to support evil, whatever the alternative. For those in this group, voting for a candidate is a recognition that one finds that candidate's qualifications are acceptable. Evil can never be acceptable, so voting for a candidate whose positions violate one's own moral code is out of the question. The ends—preventing a greater evil—cannot justify the means—supporting the lesser evil. For this group the way one votes is a reflection on one's own conscience. These voters, in the previously mentioned presidential election of 2008, did not vote, wrote in another candidate, or voted for a third party, not because neither candidate was perfect--no human is--but because the imperfections of both were so egregious that neither candidate was acceptable.
The difference between the two lies, ultimately, in two things. First, those in the first group do not believe that a vote for a candidate represents an admittance that one accepts that candidate; those in the second do. Frankly, it runs against common sense to argue that one can vote for someone without finding that person acceptable. Indeed, it borders on the absurd when one takes into account what it means for something to be acceptable or unacceptable. In the context of voting if something is acceptable it means one can vote for it, if it is unacceptable one cannot vote for it. In any case, very few could argue that a vote does not represent support at the very least for the electoral efforts of that candidate. Claiming otherwise is, frankly, obtuse to the point of ridiculousness.
While the first assumption of the “lesser of two evils” faction appears thoroughly unsound, there is still one more. The second is that supporting an evil candidate's candidacy with one's vote is justifiable as long as the alternative is bad enough. This is, in fact, the heart of the difference between the two camps. However, even here a logic examination leaves little room for doubt. In essence, the argument that the magnitude of the greater evil justifies support for the lesser is an argument that the ends—preventing the greater evil—justifies the means—supporting evil. Although the statement that the ends could justify means is by itself troubling, the reasoning behind that assertion is perhaps even more troubling. The ends justifying the means requires that an action otherwise unacceptable can be made acceptable by the end achieved. Stating that fact seems pedantic, but it is important. If the end in question—a temporal circumstance—can justify action that would be unacceptable in any other case it means that one's standard of what is acceptable or unacceptable varies with temporal circumstances, that is, that it is not eternal or unchanging.
This precisely contradicts Christian thought on the subject of right and wrong. In orthodox Christian teaching God alone sets the standard of right and wrong and because God is eternal and unchanging his standard of right and wrong is as well. In order for a “good” end to justify evil means what at one time is evil—for example, as already mentioned, forcing the public to provide funds for killing unborn children—at another time is accepted because the alternative is worse. Accepting that sort of evil requires either that one accept that one's own intelligence, not God, is ultimate arbiter of good and evil. Whereas God says that murder is always, unequivocally wrong, the voter who supports the “lesser of two evils” in this case contends that God was mistaken and that support for murder is acceptable as long as the alternative is worse. While that is frightening, when one considers the natural extension of this line of reasoning the prospect is even more so.
If one subscribes to the logic that supporting evil is justified if done in the face of greater evil, then, logically, the evil that can be theoretically supported is limited only by the possibility of greater evil existing. One could always imagine a way in which even the most depraved person or course of action could be worse, therefore a "lesser of two evils" argument could be made, quite literally, for anything, no matter how depraved or disgusting. Further, since the argument for the "lesser of two evils" principle is based not on a set of principles which ought to be followed regardless of the outcome but one the results of one's actions, in order to know that one is doing right one must manipulate events such that the desired outcome is achieved, taking the burden of responsibility for the future from God's shoulders to one's own. In addition, in a larger sense this line of reasoning places the burden for the rightness or wrongness of an action solely on one's finite ability to determine the consequences of that action, not on God's infinite ability to know right and wrong. Thus this idea not only leaves open the possibility that any action, however evil, could be supported, it attacks the very idea of objective morality, replacing it with a relative morality based on the expected results of the action, not on eternal principles.
Both of these conclusions should be unacceptable to Christian voters. A philosophy that must necessarily lead to a conclusion so obviously absurd—one could easily imagine a “lesser of two evils” argument for anything—and so antithetical to Christian beliefs is not one any Christian need entertain. Further, the basis of the “lesser of two evils” argument is also in direct contradiction with Christianity and is, in fact, a direct consequence of humanist, not Christian, thought. The idea that it is acceptable, even good, to support the lesser of two evils is one unworthy of any intelligent Christian voter, and one which should be rejected immediately upon any detailed logical analysis.
For a new birth of freedom!
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